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Introduction 
The international community has been 
increasingly concerned with the secessionist 
conflicts that have marked the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. The conflicts in the 
Transnistrian region of Moldova, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan are no 
longer ‘internal affairs’ of the successor states of the former 
Soviet Union. The EU and NATO enlargements have 
brought these organisations closer to the conflict areas and 
have increased their interest in promoting solutions to these 
conflicts. In the context of the international fight against 
terrorism, there are fears that the existence of failed states or 
uncontrolled areas can have repercussions far beyond their 
respective regions. The relative stabilisation of the Balkans 
will allow the EU and NATO to pay more attention to 
conflicts that are further away from their neighbourhood.  
In conjunction with these new international trends, Moldova 
and Georgia – two of the countries affected by conflict – 
have become active advocates of a greater international role 
in their conflict resolution processes. At the same time, the 
lack of progress on conflict settlement for more than a 
decade raises uncomfortable, albeit legitimate, questions 
about the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution 
frameworks. In other words, the international community is 
entering a phase in which it is reassessing its policies towards 
the secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet Union. But the 
challenge is not only to help solve these conflicts but also 
how to deal with Russia in the conflict resolution process.  
Russia has been heavily involved in the conflicts. 
Assessments of its role in the conflicts vary, but none 
disputes the fact that Russia plays an important role in the 
conflict regions. Its policies have been multifaceted. They 
include political, economic, security and humanitarian 
dimensions. This paper therefore attempts to map Russia’s 
policies towards the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Transnistria.
1  
The first part discusses Russia’s role in the conflicts during 
the nineties and gives some background information on the 
                                                 
1 The paper does not deal with Nagorno Karabakh, a secessionist entity 
on the territory of Azerbaijan. The nature of the conflict, let alone the 
Russian role in this conflict, differs significantly from the other three 
cases analysed in the paper.  
secessionist conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. The second 
part discusses policy trends in the Russian Federation that 
have inspired a new feeling of self-confidence. The third part 
analyses how this Russian self-confidence is resulting in new 
pro-active policies towards the secessionist entities. These 
policies include political, economic and diplomatic support, 
state-building assistance, maintaining the status quo, making 
use of the ‘Kosovo precedent’ and taking over some of the 
institutions of the secessionist entities.  
Russia and the conflicts  
Russia has been a player during and after the conflicts in 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria (see Box 1). 
During the 1990s, Russia’s policies towards the conflicts 
were largely supportive of the secessionist forces, even if not 
always unambiguously so.  
The main type of Russian support was directed through 
conflict settlement mechanisms. Russian-led peacekeeping 
operations have de facto guarded the borders of the 
secessionist entities, helping to maintain a status quo that was 
favourable to the secessionist sides. Peacekeepers
2 allowed 
the secessionist elites to pursue state-building projects while 
deterring the metropolitan states from attempting to regain 
control of the regions.
3  
                                                 
2 Although UN peacekeeping missions are different in nature and 
character from Russia’s peacekeeping operations, some of their effects 
have also been criticised. For example, Scott Pegg argued that: “…the 
specific status quo that the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus has helped to freeze is a status quo that the Turkish Cypriot 
political leadership is quite comfortable with. Thus, whatever its stated 
objectives may be, one can in some ways view UNFICYP as a midwife 
present at the birth of the Turkish Cypriot de facto state and as a 
guardian that helps make its continued existence possible” (see Scott 
Pegg,  International Society and the De Facto State, Ashgate, 
Brookfield, 1998, p. 165). 
3 Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States, US Institute of 
Peace, 2004. 
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Box 1. The conflicts in Moldova and Georgia  
South Ossetia  
The open phase of the conflict in South Ossetia (Georgia) 
lasted between 1990 and 1992 and claimed approximately a 
thousand lives. The conflict ended with a ceasefire agreement 
signed on 14 July 1992. As a result of the ceasefire agreement, 
there is a trilateral peacekeeping operation consisting of 
Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian troops. A Joint Control 
Commission (JCC) consisting of Russia, South Ossetia, North 
Ossetia (a Russian region) and Georgia oversee the security 
situation and pursue negotiations on conflict settlement. The 
OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 
supervises the situation. The EU is an observer in JCC 
meetings on economic issues. 
Transnistria  
The conflict in Transnistria (Moldova) lasted for a few months 
in the spring and summer of 1992. It resulted in some 1,000 
lost lives. A ceasefire agreement was signed on 21 July 1992. 
The war ended after the Russian 14
th Army intervened on 
behalf of Transnistria and defeated the Moldovan troops. A 
trilateral peacekeeping operation has been in place since the 
ceasefire was declared. As in South Ossetia, the peacekeeping 
troops consist of military forces from the two parties in 
conflict (Moldova and Transnistria) and Russia as the leading 
peacekeeper. The OSCE oversees the situation. Negotiations 
on conflict settlement were carried out in the so-called ‘five-
sided format’, which consisted of Moldova and Transnistria as 
conflict parties and Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as 
mediators. In October 2005, the format became ‘5+2’ after the 
EU and US joined in as observers. 
Abkhazia  
The conflict in Abkhazia has been the most serious of the three 
as it claimed more than 10,000 lives between 1992 and 1994. 
The most intense phase of the conflict lasted from August 
1992 to September 1993. A ‘Declaration on Measures for a 
Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict’ was 
signed in April 1994 in Moscow and an ‘Agreement on a 
Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces’ (Moscow Agreement) 
was signed in May 1994.
4 However, outbursts of violence and 
some guerrilla activity persisted in Abkhazia well after these 
agreements. There is a Russian-led peacekeeping operation 
under a mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and under the supervision of the United Nations (UN 
Observer Mission to Georgia – UNOMIG).  
  
Russia’s role in the conflict settlement negotiations has also 
been questioned. Moldova’s assessment of the format of 
negotiations in which Russia played a key role was 
straightforward. Moldova’s President Voronin argued that: 
“The five-party negotiations and the existing peacekeeping 
mechanism proved their ineffectiveness, and are not able to 
lead to a long-lasting solution. The dragging of the settlement 
process contributes to the consolidation of the separatist 
regime and the promotion of certain mafia-type geopolitical 
interests, which are foreign to the interests of the population 
                                                 
4 Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, signed in 
Moscow, 14 May 1994, http://www.unomig.org/. 
on the two banks of the Dnestr River”.
5 Moreover, a 
resolution of the Georgian Parliament claims that “the 
Russian Federation does nothing to promote the process of 
conflict settlement on the territory of Georgia, whereas in 
fact, the current situation is quite the contrary. A wide range 
of steps made by Russia currently strengthens the separatist 
regimes…”
6 
However, Russia’s role has not always been as 
unambiguously supportive of the secessionist entities as it is 
often assumed. Until just a few years ago, Russian policies 
towards the conflicts have sometimes veered between open 
support for the secessionists and periods of rapprochement 
with Georgia and Moldova.  
In the mid-1990s, there were moments when Russia has 
reduced the level of its support for Abkhazia and to a lesser 
extent for South Ossetia. This can be partly explained by the 
secessionist challenge posed by Chechnya for Russia’s own 
territorial integrity. Under such conditions, Russia was rather 
constrained in its potential support for other secessionist 
movements in the former Soviet Union, as it was seen as a 
dangerous precedent for Russia itself.  
Secondly, in 1994, Georgia joined the CIS and its Collective 
Security Treaty, and accepted Russian military bases on its 
territory. Georgia’s implicit expectations were that in 
exchange Russia would support its efforts to reassert control 
over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s understanding of 
the deal differed. Russia supported Eduard Shevardnadze to 
assert himself as the leader of the country in the context of 
the civil war with the supporters of the ousted president 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, but did not take a pro-active stance on 
the issue of Georgia’s reunification. Even so, it did take part 
in a CIS blockade against Abkhazia (which is formally still 
in force but is not being enforced). 
In Moldova, the rapprochement with Russia followed the 
arrival in power of the then pro-Russian Communist party in 
2001 and lasted until 2003. Moldova’s implicit expectation 
was that a rapprochement with Russia would give it the all 
important support that it needed in its efforts to resolve the 
conflict in Transnistria. Thus, Moldova implicitly agreed to 
follow Moscow’s political line in international relations, 
create favourable, even preferential treatment for Russian 
businesses, promote the Russian language in Moldova and 
generally move closer to the Russian Federation in political, 
social and economic terms. The main thing that Moldova 
wanted in exchange was the withdrawal of Russian support 
for the Transnistrian authorities and the ousting of Igor 
Smirnov, Transnistria’s self-proclaimed president and a 
Russian citizen. 
Between 2001 and 2003, it seemed that the policy line in 
Moscow was that a reunited and friendly Moldova was more 
important to Russian interests than a pro-Russian Transnistria 
and an unfriendly Republic of Moldova. Thus Russia moved 
to limit its support for Transnistria in order to promote a 
settlement of the conflict. According to an official, 
                                                 
5 Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, speech addressed to the North 
Atlantic Council, Brussels, 7 June 2005. 
6 Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia regarding the Current 
Situation in the Conflict Regions on the Territory of Georgia and 
Ongoing Peace Operations, 11 November 2005.  ‘Outsourcing’ de facto Statehood | 3 
discussions on withdrawing Russian support for the Smirnov-
led authorities culminated in talks between Moldova and 
Russia about which region to appoint Smirnov as governor in 
order to clear him out of the way and move towards a 
settlement of the conflict.
7 However, it seems that this 
withdrawal of support was only ever half-hearted and in the 
end everything went back to square one – strong Russian 
support for Transnistria and tense relations with Moldova. 
The turning point was the failure of the so-called ‘Kozak 
Memorandum’, a unilateral Russian plan to settle the conflict 
on largely Russian terms, which was rejected by Moldova in 
November 2003. After this, Moldovan-Russian relations 
have gone from bad to worse. 
The chopping and changing Russian policies towards the 
secessionist entities in the 1990s were never on a large 
enough scale to truly shake the status quo that allowed the de 
facto states to carry on their existence. Periodic 
rapprochements between Russia and Moldova or Georgia did 
not lead to the settlement of the conflicts, as both sides of the 
deal had erroneous expectations of each other’s intensions. 
This made the deals fail, and made relations between Russia 
on the one hand and Moldova and Georgia on the other 
considerably more complicated. Weighed down with such a 
heavy baggage of mutual frustrations, Russia has started to 
change its approach to the conflicts, largely due to internal 
developments in Russia. 
Russia’s new self-confidence  
The Russia of 2006 has obtained a newly felt sense of its 
own power. This explains a number of Russian policies in the 
CIS. Contrary to the situation just a few years ago, Russia’s 
agenda is not inward-looking for the first time in almost two 
decades. Russia wants and thinks it is ready to act assertively 
around all of its own borders and beyond. This new 
assertiveness was certainly reflected in Russian policy 
towards the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Transnistria, but these were only examples of a broader 
change in the thinking of Russian decision-makers.  
A simple comparison suffices. In 2000, the Russian 
Federation stated that the top priority of its foreign policy 
was to “create favourable external conditions for steady 
development of Russia, for improving its economy”.
8 
Accordingly, Russia's foreign policy was subordinated to 
domestic imperatives.  In 2005, the mood changed. In his 
2005 annual address, President Vladimir Putin claimed that it 
was “certain that Russia should continue its civilising 
mission on the Eurasian continent”.
9  
Why does Russia feel so strong?  
One factor is the state of its economy. Russia has 
experienced steady growth since 1999 plus a significant 
inflow of cash due to high oil and gas prices. Unlike in the 
1990s, Russia is not concerned with a lack of resources to 
pursue its foreign policy. The 2000 ‘foreign policy concept’ 
bluntly stated that Russia's capacity to address the challenges 
                                                 
7 Interview with an official, Moscow, January 2006.   
8 The ‘foreign policy concept’ of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000.    
9 Vladimir Putin, annual address to the Federal Assembly, 25 April 
2005, Moscow (www.kremlin.ru).  
it faced was “aggravated by the limited resource support for 
the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, making it 
difficult to uphold its foreign economic interests and 
narrowing down the framework of its information and 
cultural influence abroad”.
10 A few years later, Putin claimed 
that “the growth of the economy, political stability and the 
strengthening of the state have had a beneficial effect on 
Russia’s international position”.
11 
A second factor is domestic politics. An authoritarian 
government that does not feel challenged in domestic politics 
is less compromising in its foreign policy.
12 The current 
elites in Russia have ensured a nearly unchallengeable 
dominance at the expense of democratic pluralism. There is a 
certain paradox in that internationally the Russian elite 
project their state as strong, dynamic and pragmatic, whereas 
internally they often depict the state as weak, vulnerable and 
alarmist. The then head of the presidential administration 
Dmitry Medvedev
13 stated in April 2005 that “if we cannot 
consolidate the elites, Russia will disappear as a state”.
14 It is 
claimed that Russia is facing a moment of existential danger. 
By building the image of a Russia under siege from Islamic 
terrorists and Western-inspired ‘orange’ revolutionaries, the 
domestic agenda is to rally everybody around the existing 
authorities. 
Thus, the centralisation of power and open authoritarianism 
are not only excused and explained but deemed necessary 
and legitimised. It is the only way to preserve the state and 
the nation. As a result of such a discourse, there remains no 
mainstream political force in Russia that would or could 
challenge the dominance of the Putin administration. The 
political space in Russia has been shaped in a way that only 
radicals – extremist nationalists and Islamic terrorists – are 
the challengers. In this context Putin is seen as the lesser of 
evils. Even Mikhail Khodorkovsky, formerly Russia’s richest 
oligarch, claims from jail that Putin is “more liberal and more 
democratic than 70% of the population”.
15 Thus, as a result 
of such a discourse of weakness, the government has the 
excuses to centralise power in order to become strong – 
domestically and internationally.   
                                                 
10 ‘Foreign policy concept’ of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000.  
11 Vladimir Putin, annual address to the Federal Assembly, 26 May 
2004, Moscow (www.kremlin.ru). 
12 The link between internal regime insecurity and foreign policy 
behaviour in non-democratic states is developed in an article about 
China. The article traces how most compromises made by Chinese 
leadership in disputes with their neighbours coincide with periods of 
internal instability in China, such as the revolt in Tibet, the legitimacy 
crisis after the Tiananmen upheaval and separatist violence in Xinjiang. 
See Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: 
Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes”, International 
Security 30:2, 2005, pp. 46-83.  
13 Dmitry Medvedev is one of President Putin’s closest associates. He 
was appointed first deputy prime minister of the Russian government 
on 14 November 2005. Formerly Vladimir Putin's chief of staff, he is 
also on the Gazprom board of directors, a post he has held since 2000. 
14 Interview with Dmitry Medvedev, Expert, 4 April 2005 
(downloadable at 
http://www.kremlin.ru/text/publications/2005/04/86307.shtml). 
15 Mikhail Khodorkovsky, “Krizis Liberalizma v Rossii”, 29 March 
2004, Vedomosti (downloadable at 
http://khodorkovsky.ru/speech/82.html). 4 | Nicu Popescu 
A third factor is international politics. International events 
also seem to play into the hands of a new-found feeling of 
strength in Russia. Iraq has become a quagmire. The US is 
too busy running around in the Afghanistan-Iraq-Iran 
triangle. The EU is seen as being in the midst of a profound 
and paralysing crisis. In fact, many Russians consider the EU 
crisis to be profound but certainly not paralysing. Both the 
US and EU need Russia in their attempts to prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear capability for non-peaceful use. In the 
CIS, the democratic governments that emerged after the 'rose 
and orange revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine respectively 
are struggling along in the face of major difficulties. The 
popularity of Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili seems 
to be on the wane, the country is only making slow economic 
progress and political centralisation seems to be on the rise. 
In Ukraine, President Viktor Yushchenko is politically weak, 
the economy is performing poorly and political stability 
cannot yet be seen at the end of the tunnel. In contrast to 
these post-revolutionary states, the regimes in Belarus and 
Uzbekistan seem as strong as ever.  
A fourth factor is Chechnya. The defeat of the nationalist 
secessionist movement in Chechnya meant that Russia is no 
longer fearful of supporting secessionism in other states. In 
the 1990s, having a strong secessionist movement on its own 
territory, Russia was at least outwardly supportive of the 
territorial integrity of other states such as Georgia and 
Moldova, and not only them. Any precedent for successful 
secession resulting from violent conflict was seen as 
questioning the future of Chechnya in Russia. Thus, for most 
of the 1990s Russia has been hesitating between the tendency 
to support the secessionist entities in Moldova and Georgia 
and the fears of spillover effects for Russia itself. All this has 
changed.  
The second Chechen war that started in 1999 led to the defeat 
of the secessionist movement in Chechnya. Certainly, the 
Chechen guerrillas still pose a serious security challenge to 
the internal stability of the Russian Federation but they are 
not a credible secessionist force. President Putin is right in 
saying that “there are other regions in the northern Caucasus 
where the situation is even more worrying than it is in 
Chechnya”.
16 The war in Chechnya is not a war for or against 
the independence of Chechnya. In fact it is not a Chechen 
conflict anymore, but a north Caucasus conflict with large 
religious, social and security implications. Russia defeated 
the nationalist secessionist movement in Chechnya, but 
ended up with a geographically larger and potentially more 
destructive security challenge. Whatever the instability in the 
north Caucasus, Russia feels that the Chechen factor is no 
longer a constraint on its policies towards the secessionist 
entities in Georgia and Moldova.
17  
Thus, in Russia’s assessment it is the right international and 
domestic context to start acting. If before 2004 Russia was 
defensive, by 2006 it had started to be on the offensive. A 
2000 assessment of the situation argued that, in the CIS, 
Russia’s objective is “to maintain, rather than enlarge the 
Russian presence in the region. Moscow tries to save what it 
                                                 
16 Vladimir Putin, transcript of the press conference for the Russian and 
foreign media, 31 January 2006, the Kremlin, Moscow.  
17 Interview with an expert, Moscow, 12 January 2006.  
still has, rather than extend its political and military forward 
bases in its southern neighbourhood”.
18 This is not the case 
anymore. In 2006, Dmitry Trenin from the Carnegie Moscow 
Centre think tank argues that Russian leadership “came to the 
conclusion that the withdrawal has ended, and it is time to 
counter-attack… it is time to re-establish a great power and 
that the CIS is the space where Russian economic, political, 
and informational dominance should be established”.
19 
The 'new thinking' of the Russian Federation, was put 
forward as an article for the Wall Street Journal by Sergei 
Ivanov, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. 
He claimed that Russia's two main challenges are 
“interference in Russia's internal affairs by foreign states, 
either directly or through structures that they support... [and] 
violent assault on the constitutional order of some post-
Soviet states”.
20 No distinction is made between non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and networks used to 
finance terrorist activities in Russia and the Western-funded 
democracy-promoting NGOs. Both are seen as foreign 
organisations seeking to destabilise the internal situation in 
Russia and its allies.  
Putin said in the aftermath of the Beslan siege that “the weak 
get beaten up”.
21 International affairs are a fight, and in this 
fight Russia has to re-establish its regional dominance. This 
is the new prism through which Russia sees its international 
relations. Thus, the new Russian agenda is not to maintain 
current levels of influence in the CIS but to re-establish 
Russian dominance in most of the CIS. Russia’s foreign 
policy objectives are not defensive for the first time in more 
than two decades. Russian policies on Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Transnistria are both indicators of a new trend 
and a means to put into practice a new foreign policy agenda. 
Quite logically, Russia’s new self-confidence has developed 
into a new set of pro-active policies, which was clearly 
demonstrated by its policies towards the secessionist entities 
in Georgia and Moldova. 
Russia’s pro-active policies towards the 
secessionist entities  
Russia’s policies towards secessionist entities are marked by 
an official recognition of the territorial integrity of Moldova 
and Georgia but in practical terms by open support for many 
of the demands of the secessionist entities. The ambiguity of 
Russian policies creates important incentives for entities to 
persist in their quest to secede. This quest is supported 
through a number of policies. 
                                                 
18 Alexei Malashenko, “Post-sovetskie gosudarstva iuga i interesy 
Moskvy” (“Post-Soviet States of the South and Moscow’s Interests”), 
Pro et Contra, Vol. 5:3, 2000, Moscow, p. 43. 
19 Author’s interview with Dmitry Trenin, Moscow, 13 January 2006. 
For the same argument, see interview with Dmitry Trenin, Strana.ru, 26 
January 2006 
(http://www.strana.ru/stories/02/05/20/2976/271554.html).   
20 “The New Russian Doctrine”, Sergei Ivanov, The Wall Street 
Journal, 11 January 2006. 
21 Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina (Statement by 
President Putin), Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 6 September 2004, 
http://www.rg.ru/2004/09/06/president.html. ‘Outsourcing’ de facto Statehood | 5 
Political support 
Russia gives high level political attention to the secessionist 
authorities and has often acted as a bridge between the three 
self-proclaimed republics, which created a community of 
their own, informally called ‘SNG-2’, or even ‘NATO-2’.
22 
While the level of institutionalisation of SNG-2 should not be 
overestimated, it has summits, ministerial meetings and 
cooperation networks. In fact most of these summits take 
place in Moscow and the leaders of the secessionist entities 
are received by high-level Russian officials.
23 The Russian 
Foreign Ministry also typically refers to the leaders of the 
unrecognised secessionist entities as “presidents”, implying a 
degree of recognition of the secessionist entities.   
Other examples of high-level political support include 
President Putin meeting the leader of Abkhazia Sergei 
Bagapsh and South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity and even 
apparently trying to set up a meeting for them with EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Javier Solana
24 in Sochi in April 2005. Similarly, high-level 
support was offered to a presidential candidate in Abkhazia’s 
2004 elections when the (defeated) candidate Raul Khajimba 
was campaigning with posters depicting him and President 
Putin shaking hands.
25  
‘Passportisation’ 
A visible example of Russian support is where Russia has 
granted citizenship to the residents of the unrecognised 
entities.  Some 90% of the residents of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia are said to have Russian passports.
26 The number is 
considerably smaller in Transnistria, where some 15% of the 
population hold Russian passports. The policy of 
‘passportisation’ is a state policy. In the passports themselves 
it is clearly stated that they are issued by the Russian Foreign 
Ministry.
27 Its main objective is to secure a legitimate right 
for Russia to claim to represent the interests of the 
                                                 
22 The Russian for Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is 
Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimyh Gosudartsv, or SNG. But SNG-2 stands for 
Sodruzhestvo Nepriznanyh Gosudartsv (Community of Unrecognised 
States). Sometimes the SNG-2 is translated into English as CIS-2, but it 
does not reflect the play of words between SNG and SNG-2. In 
addition to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, SNG-2 includes 
also Nagorno-Karabakh. The second informal name for the group of 
secessionist entities is NATO-2, which is an acronym for Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Ossetia. 
23 See Vladimir Socor, “Bagapsh, Kokoity, Smirnov touch base in 
Moscow”,  Eurasia Daily Monitor, 28 January 2005. 
www.jamestown.org. 
24 Vladimir Socor, “EU Policy disarray in Georgia and Moldova”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15 April 2005. 
25 For the Russian role in the Abkhaz 2004 elections see “Putin 
Meddles in Abkhazia Presidential Race”, Civil Georgia, 31 August 
2004, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7721. 
26 In fact, Georgia itself has been partly responsible for the situation, as 
it refused the granting of UN passports to the residents of Abkhazia in 
the 1990s, which resulted in the mass acquisition by Abkhazians of 
Russian passports as a means to travel. Had Georgia accepted the 
granting of UN passports to Abkhazians, they would not have needed 
to get Russian passports to travel.  
27 The information about the issuing authority on Russian passports in 
Abkhazia clearly state that they are issued by “MID Rossii”, that is the 
Foreign Ministry of Russia. Author’s observation in Sukhum(i), 
Abkhazia, March 2006.   
secessionist entities because they consist of Russian citizens. 
Thus Russia is creating a political and even legal basis for 
intervention for the sake of protecting its own ‘citizens’ in 
the secessionist entities.   
Russia’s introduction of visa regimes for Georgia in 2001 is 
also designed, inter alia, to strengthen the separatist entities 
and weaken the legitimacy of the states. The residents of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were exempted from the visa 
regime.  
Conflict settlement mechanisms  
Russia plays a key role in the conflict resolution negotiation 
process. Russia often acts not so much as a mediator equally 
distant from the positions of both sides, but as an actor in 
negotiations with its own interests. 
Russia is not opposed to conflict resolution. It is rather 
interested in a settlement that first and foremost serves 
Russian interests by respecting a number of conditions. A 
first condition is that the secessionist entities need to have 
decisive influence over the affairs of the reunified states, 
even if it means a possible future power-sharing arrangement 
may not work in practice. Second, Russia has to act as the 
main power-broker in any possible power-sharing 
arrangement. This would be possible because Russia would 
remain the main external ‘guarantor’ of the settlement, but 
also because of the potentially low viability of the reunified 
states, which will have to rely on external power brokers. 
The Russian guarantees also include a military presence.  
Interestingly enough, the main Russian-brokered agreement 
that came closest to solving a conflict – the ‘Kozak 
Memorandum’ for Transnistria
28 met these three conditions: 
1) high level of influence for the secessionist entity to the 
point of creating a dysfunctional state, 2) Russia as the main 
power broker and 3) Russian military presence.  
When Moldova implicitly accepted these three conditions, 
progress towards a new agreement to settle the conflict 
accelerated. However, in the end Moldova backed down 
because of doubts about the viability of the arrangement, 
which was clearly highlighted by the negative international 
reactions to the memorandum, including from the US, the EU 
and the OSCE. Similarly, Russian proposals to Georgia and 
Moldova to create ‘common states’ in the late 1990s also 
reflected a level of decentralisation that was not very likely 
to work in practice.
29 
Diplomatic support 
Russia often supports the secessionist entities on the 
international arena. One example is that three annual OSCE 
Ministerial Councils in 2003, 2004 and 2005 failed to adopt 
common statements because of disagreements between an 
overwhelming number of OSCE member states on the one 
                                                 
28 See text of the “Russian Draft Memorandum on the basic principles 
of the state structure of a united state in Moldova” (Kozak 
Memorandum), 17 November 2003, 
http://eurojournal.org/more.php?id=107_0_1_18_M5. 
29 It would be fair to say that it is not only the Russian Federation that 
supports this type of agreements. The EU supported a Serbia-
Montenegro confederation with a level of decentralisation that made 
the common state barely functional.   6 | Nicu Popescu 
hand and Russia on the other. These disagreements were 
precisely related to the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova and 
the withdrawal of Russian troops from these countries.  
The issue of unresolved conflicts is more and more 
prominent on the EU-Russia agenda, including in the road 
map for the ‘common space of cooperation in the field of 
external security’ where conflicts in the ‘adjacent’ regions 
are considered one of the priority areas. 
‘Outsourcing’ of institutions 
Russia has also been crucial in providing support for state 
and institution building in the secessionist regions. In fact, 
some of the security institutions of the de facto states are 
‘outsourced’ to the Russian Federation. ‘Outsourcing’ is used 
in business jargon to describe a situation in which the 
organisational functions of an enterprise are transferred to a 
third party or country.
30 A somehow similar phenomenon is 
occurring with the ‘state’ institutions of the secessionist 
entities. They are ‘outsourced’ to Russian state institutions. 
However, if ‘outsourcing’ in businesses presupposes that the 
‘outsourcer’ keeps overall control of the organisational and 
production functions of the enterprise, this is not always the 
case in the secessionist entities. While they initially 
‘outsourced’ such functions as defence and intelligence 
institutions to the Russian Federation, they have to a large 
extent ceased to control them.  
The local ‘security’ institutions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Transnistria are often headed by Russians or officials 
who are de facto delegated by state institutions of the 
Russian Federation. This most often includes staff in the 
local intelligence services and the defence ministries. 
Examples of Russians de facto delegated to the secessionist 
entities include defence ministers Anatoli Barankevich 
(South Ossetia) and Sultan Sosnaliev (Abkhazia), local 
intelligence chief Iarovoi (South Ossetia) and Interior 
Minister Mindzaev (South Ossetia).
31 But Russian presence 
is also visible beyond the security services. An Abkhazia 
Prime Minister in 2004/2005 Nodar Khashba came from the 
Russian ministry of emergency situations. The incumbent 
Prime Minister Morozov in South Ossetia is also from 
Russia. The ‘outsourcing’ of the institutions of the 
secessionist entities to Russia is at its most prevalent in South 
Ossetia, somehow less so in Abkhazia, and relatively little 
(beyond the security services) in Transnistria. Such 
arrangements are not necessarily welcome in the secessionist 
entities themselves, especially in Abkhazia and Transnistria, 
but are, according to officials, desired mainly by Russia.
32  
Economic support 
Russia plays a key role in the economic sustainability of the 
secessionist entities. In fact one can credibly make the 
                                                 
30 See Wikipedia on ‘outsourcing’ or ‘contracting out’ 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outsourcing). The Economist defines 
‘outsourcing’ as the process when companies hand work they used to 
perform in-house to outside firms; see The Economist, “Survey of 
Outsourcing”, 11 November 2004.    
31 Interviews with Georgian officials, Tbilisi, March 2006.  
32 Interviews with experts and officials in Sukhum(i) and Tbilisi, March 
2006 and Tiraspol, December 2005.  
argument that the ‘independence’ of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia depends heavily on Russia.
33 Russia is certainly the 
most important trading partner of the secessionist entities of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian officials claimed that 
while some of the Georgian exports were banned from 
entering Russia on phytosanitary grounds, similar goods 
from Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to be accepted, 
which indicated the political nature of manipulation of trade 
issues in the region.
34 
For years, Transnistrian industry has been benefiting from 
Russian subsidies. Transnistria’s debt to Gazprom amounts 
to one billion euro, which means that for years Transnistria 
has not paid for its gas consumption.
35 In fact the competitive 
advantage of Transnistrian industry is very much based on 
these kinds of subsidies. 
The social dimension of Russian support is also considerable 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian government not 
only granted citizenships to an overwhelming majority of 
residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also pays 
pensions there.
36 These pensions are higher than Georgia’s, 
which creates additional incentives for these regions to join 
the Russian Federation rather than seek a settlement of the 
conflict. The paying of pensions and granting of citizenship 
is explained by humanitarian concerns that the Russian 
Federation has about the residents of these regions.
37  
Russia is also the main investor in the secessionist regions. 
Some investments in Transnistrian industry and the Abkhaz 
tourist infrastructure are justified on economic grounds. 
However, it is clear that the conflict regions are far from 
being attractive for investments and many such investments 
are driven by political imperatives and not economic logic. 
At least some, if not most, of Russian investments take place 
not because they make sense economically but because 
Russian authorities put forward Russian businessmen to take 
part in such investments as a sign of support for the 
secessionist entities.
38 In a state where businesses are closely 
intertwined with the state, as is the case in Russia, such 
practices are not difficult to implement.  
Economic support for the secessionist entities is coupled with 
economic pressure on Moldova and Georgia. In 2005, Russia 
introduced restrictions on meat and vegetable exports from 
Moldova and Georgia to Russia. In March 2006 Russia 
banned all Moldovan and Georgian wine and brandy exports 
to Russia, as well as Georgian mineral water. At the same 
time Russia increased gas prices for Moldova and Georgia. 
Such restrictions did not affect the secessionist entities. The 
                                                 
33 Dov Lynch, Why Georgia Matters, Chaillot Paper 86, EU ISS, Paris, 
p. 36, www.iss-eu.org.  
34 Interviews with Georgian diplomats, Moscow, January 2006; Tbilisi, 
March 2006.  
35 Centre for Strategic Studies and Reforms, Research Paper on 
Transnistria (Chisinau: November 2003), p. 28; available at: 
http://www.cisr-md.org/pdf/0311%20transn-research.pdf  
36 For example in Abkhazia, Russia pays some 30,000 pensions. The 
minimum pension is approximately 30 euro. Interview with a de facto 
deputy-prime minister of Abkhazia, Sukhum(i), March 2006. 
37 Interview with a Russian expert, Paris, May 2005. 
38 Interviews with experts and officials in Sukhum(i), Abkhazia, March 
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explanation was simple. In the words of the Russian 
ambassador to Moldova, “one thing is a Russian compatriot 
in Moldova or Kirghizia, and another thing is a compatriot in 
Transnistria or Abkhazia”.
39 The latter are certainly closer 
than the former.  
The ‘status quo game’ 
Russia’s preferred policy is to preserve the status quo. The 
status quo gives Russia enough room for manoeuvre to 
safeguard its interests in the conflict areas. Thus Russia is set 
to prevent the modification of the conflict resolution 
mechanisms and Western involvement in conflict resolution. 
Its main argument is that the conflicts should stay “frozen” 
and that any attempt to “thaw” them is dangerous and 
counterproductive. However the conflicts are not frozen at 
all.
40 It is their settlement that is frozen. The preservation of 
the status quo means the entrenchment and deepening of the 
conflicts. Thus the ‘status quo game’ means moving away 
from a solution while fuelling tensions, which could escalate 
at any moment.  
The ‘Kosovo precedent’  
In the context of discussing the Kosovo issue, Russia came 
closest [and at the highest level] in accepting that Kosovo 
does constitute a precedent worth considering in Georgia. 
President Putin stated in 2006 that “if someone thinks that 
Kosovo can be granted full independence as a state, then why 
should the Abkhaz or the South-Ossetian peoples not also 
have the right to statehood? I am not talking here about how 
Russia would act. But we know, for example, that Turkey 
recognised the Republic of Northern Cyprus. I am not saying 
that Russia would immediately recognise Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia as independent states, but international life knows 
such precedents … we need generally accepted, universal 
principles for resolving these problems”.
41 Russia has been 
moving towards acceptance of Kosovo’s independence while 
trying to extract the maximum from the Kosovo precedent in 
the post-Soviet space.  
The Kosovo precedent has certainly infused new trends into 
the politics of the de facto states. Kosovo’s possible move 
towards independence, albeit “conditional”, creates a new 
raison d’être for the secessionist entities to resist any conflict 
settlement in the hope that sooner or later they will follow 
Kosovo.
42 For example, the Abkhaz de facto president 
openly states that “if Kosovo is recognised, Abkhazia will be 
recognised in the course of three days. I am absolutely sure 
of that”.
43  
                                                 
39 See “We arrived to see who wants to be with us” (My priehali 
ubedista kto hochet byt vmeste s nami), Olvia Press, 6 October 2005, 
http://olvia.idknet.com/ol46-10-05.htm. 
40 See Dov Lynch, 2004, op. cit.  
41 President Vladimir Putin, transcript of the Press Conference for the 
Russian and foreign media, 31 January 2006, The Kremlin, Moscow.  
42 Interviews with officials and experts in Tiraspol, Transnistria 
(December 2005) and Sukhum(i), Abkhazia, (March 2006). 
43 Interview with Sergei Bagapsh, de facto president of Abkhazia, 
Svobodnaya Gruzia, 28 February 2006, published originally in Vremya 
Novostei.   
De facto annexation  
The overall result of the above-mentioned policies is that the 
secessionist entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are 
moving towards being incorporated into the Russian 
Federation  de facto. In fact the secessionist entities 
‘outsource’ not only some of their institutions but the control 
of their entities to the Russian Federation. Most of the 
population in these regions have Russian passports, 
pensioners receive pensions from the Russian state, the 
Russian rouble is the local currency, many of the de facto 
officials of the secessionist entities are sent ‘on missions’ by 
the Russian Federation.  In addition, there is a process of 
legislative harmonisation between the legal systems of the 
Russian Federation and those of the secessionist entities. And 
even in Transnistria, which currently has its own currency, 
Russia has raised the issue of Transnistria eventually 
adopting the Russian rouble as the local currency.
44 
Reflecting these developments, Moscow’s policies towards 
these secessionist regions look very much like Moscow’s 
policy towards other Russian regions. This was very visible 
during the heavy and high-level intervention of Russia in the 
Abkhaz presidential elections in 2004. In an interview, an 
expert in Moscow said that “Abkhazia is a de facto 
continuation of the Krasnodar region” of Russia.
45 The fact 
that Russia takes over the ‘power’ structures in the 
secessionist entities also looks very much like Russian 
regional politics. In the Russian Federation, the control of the 
‘power structures’ – Ministry of Defence, intelligence, 
prosecutor’s office and police – are a competence of the 
federal centre, i.e. Moscow. Russian regions do not control 
the security institutions at regional level, even if they have 
some degree of self-governance in political and economic 
matters. The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not 
far from that.   
The secessionist entities are not simply a continuation of 
Russia. Abkhazia stresses that it wants to be an independent 
state,
46 not a Russian region. They also stress that in the 2004 
Abkhaz presidential elections the Moscow-backed candidate 
lost the elections. Transnistria does not have a border with 
Russia and it would be difficult to see how a second 
‘Kaliningrad’ in Transnistria would work in practice. 
Moreover, the interests of the secessionist entities, their 
domestic policy patterns and strategic goals might differ 
from Russia’s preferences. However, their rapprochement 
with Russia is not far from a point of no return, mainly so in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44 See “Igor Smirnov does not exclude that Transnistria might join the 
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45 Interview, Moscow, 13 January 2006.  
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Conclusions 
Russia plays a dominant role in the survival and evolution of 
the secessionist entities in Georgia and Moldova. There have 
been periods when Russia was rather supportive of the 
governments of Moldova and Georgia. However, for the last 
few years Russian policies towards the secessionist entities 
have become more assertive. This was due to a new feeling 
of self-confidence among Russian elites. 
This new self-confidence has been inspired by a number of 
factors, such as economic growth in Russia, consolidation of 
Putin’s ‘power vertical’, the defeat of the Chechen 
secessionist movement and the West’s problems in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. These have all led to a feeling in 
Moscow that Russia has the resources and the proper 
international conditions to reassert its dominance in the 
former Soviet Union. Stepping up support for the secessionist 
entities is seen as a way to achieve that.  
The policies of Russian support for the secessionist entities 
of the former Soviet Union are a complex web of political, 
economic, social, humanitarian, security and military actions. 
These policies include keeping military forces on the ground 
– not only peacekeepers but also military bases, training of 
military forces, providing economic subsidies, granting 
Russian citizenship and passports (the policy of so-called 
‘passportisation’),   paying   pensions,   granting   preferential  
 
trade regimes, ensuring diplomatic and political support on 
the international stage, interfering in the domestic politics of 
the unrecognised entities, using conflict settlement 
mechanisms to freeze the conflict resolution processes, 
delegating Russian state employees to serve in key posts in 
the unrecognised governments of the secessionist entities etc. 
These policies of support are combined with economic and 
political pressure on the governments of Moldova and 
Georgia.  
An overall assessment of Russia’s policies towards the 
secessionist entities is that in many instances they create 
serious disincentives for any conflict settlement. The policy 
of strengthening the secessionist regimes and weakening 
legitimate states creates serious obstacles to conflict 
resolution. Under such conditions it is not only possible but 
is even attractive for the secessionist entities to keep the 
conflicts unresolved.  
However, with the conflicts kept unresolved and an 
increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy, the secessionist 
entities are becoming more and more de facto parts of the 
Russian Federation. Moscow’s policy towards these regions 
in many instances resembles policies towards subjects of the 
Russian Federation. Thus the paradox is that, in their fight 
for independence, the secessionist entities are quickly 
‘outsourcing’ this independence to another state.  
 